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Headnote:    No account of the origins or essence of the collective cultural 
phenomena we call "Romanticism" can be adequate.  The following does not pretend to 
be.  Since the later nineteenth century, British, French, German, and American critics 
have attempted to define Romanticism and, more particularly, English Romantic Poetry:  
as an outgrowth of the French or the American and French Revolutions; as a reaction to 
the Enlightenment; as an extension of certain aspects of the later Enlightenment (what 
Isaiah Berlin has called the "Counter-Enlightenment"); as a set of stylistic features and 
concerns, as political ideology; as essentially conservative, as at bottom liberal; as 
emotional; as metaphysical; as spiritual; as historically self-conscious in a new way; as 
incapable of escaping forces of history that are not "romantic"; as itself contradictory, bi-
polar, and dynamic; and as creating new myths successfully and unsuccessfully.  This 
essay posits as one common denominator the presence--the creation--in English 
Romantic Poetry of new ideas that specifically respond to and address rapid changes in 
the nature of knowledge, changes that affect established interrelationships between the 
arts, the sciences, industry and technology, politics, psychology, language, and history.  
The best cogent, brief, self-critical account of the construction of various historical 
accounts of English Romantic Poetry is found in David Perkins, Is Literary History 
Possible? Chapter 5, "The Construction of English Romantic Poetry as a Literary 
Classification" (1992).  Multiple, current views are collected by Ian McCalman, ed., The 
Romantic Age:  British Culture 1776-1832 (1999).  
 
  "Great spirits" then "on earth" write what we, inadequately, call "romantic 
poetry"; they respond to a cultural upheaval as deep as any in the history of the West.  
Yet, in the later 18th century, the word "culture" in its modern sense does not exist in 
English.  Its equivalent, the unifying phrase, "the arts and sciences," is favored by Hume, 
Goldsmith, and on the Continent.  In this upheaval, key shifts disturb the nature of 
knowledge and the relation between the arts and the sciences.  Keats reflects that a 
"general and gregarious advance of intellect . . . really a grand march of intellect . . . a 
mighty providence subdues the mightiest minds to the service of the time being," an idea 
Coleridge marks in his Philosophical Lectures as "the gradual Evolution of the Mind of 
the World, contemplated as a single Mind in the different successive Stages of its 
development."  Why does Keats feel keenly such "a grand march of intellect?"  Why does 
he reflect that while Milton "had sure as great powers," Wordsworth's poetry is now the 
better model? 
  In the later 18th century, western culture stops turning automatically to its 
classical heritage and gropes awkwardly, at times violently, to establish new modes of 
knowing, governing, and creating, modes we call modern, democratic, and romantic.  An 
epistemological crisis occurs.  Marilyn Butler speaks of it as an epistemological 
revolution.  It challenges the arts, and poetry most of all, because poetry had been 
regarded, following Aristotle and Sidney, as superior to history and philosophy, uniting 
the particularity of the former with the universality of the latter, producing texts at once 
moral, learned, and metaphysical. 
  Virgil had been used for centuries as a kind of encyclopedia, and Homer had been 
interpreted according to what Pope describes as his "Allegorical Fable:  If we reflect 
upon those innumerable Knowledges, those Secrets of Nature and Physical Philosophy which Homer is generally suppos'd to have wrapt up in his Allegories, what a new and 
ample Scene of Wonder may this Consideration afford us?  How fertile will that 
Imagination appear, which was able to cloath all the Properties of Elements, the 
Qualifications of the Mind, the Virtues and Vices, in Forms and Persons; and to introduce 
them into Actions agreeable to the Nature of the Things they shadow'd?" 
  Yet new knowledge now arises at an unprecedented rate, its source no longer the 
ancient world, except for modern scholarship about smaller details of that world.  For the 
first time in the history of the West, writers apply the adjective "accelerating" to the rate 
at which knowledge is being accumulated.  Ancient mythology, often become a stock 
prop, is, in Johnson's (and Coleridge's) dismissive judgment, "exploded," and early on 
Wordsworth rejects it.  However learned and talented, attempts to revitalize it, such as 
Akenside's "Hymn to the Naiads," grow feeble.  Primitivism provides folk myths from 
the pagan North and posits societies where poetry still reigns central to all a culture 
knows and values.  Among many, William Duff descants on the apparent connection 
between the primitive and poetry itself.  The last section of his Essay on Original Genius 
(1767) argues "That original Poetic Genius will in general be displayed in its utmost 
vigour in the early and uncultivated periods of Society, which are peculiarly favorable to 
it; and that it will seldom appear in a very high degree in cultivated life."  Moreover, 
views of what constitutes knowledge, truth, reality, psychology, and history now take 
shape with scant or no connection to classical heritage or primitivism, and with a rapidity 
never before witnessed.  Paul Johnson calls this era the creation of the modern.  Emory 
Neff remarks, the romantics become the classics of the modern world. 
  And, at that time, starkly put, poetry is threatened by forms of knowledge it does 
not discover, can not compass, and expresses awkwardly:  knowledge in natural 
philosophy, rapidly maturing from Bacon and Newton into modern experimental science; 
mathematical relations and a new science of statistics; social and economic theories at home in prose; and new philosophy, the nature of which, since Gassendi and Hobbes, 
seems frankly anti-poetic.  (True, Gassendi read Lucretius but chiefly to advance his 
Epicurean atomism; Hobbes's translation of Homer and his verse autobiography in Latin 
tend only to confirm the anti-poetic charge.)  Locke rejects figurative language.  Pascal 
says Descartes slit the throat of poetry.  The whole story is too complicated to get entirely 
right.  But, clearly, modern sciences and mathematics surpass the ancients', who lose that 
quarrel.  In the arts, claims of modern superiority are made, but stronger countervailing 
voices, such as Hume's, talk of rise and decline.  Dryden had remarked in his Defence of 
the Epilogue that "I profess to have no other ambition . . . than that Poetry may not go 
backward, when all other Arts and Sciences are advancing."  Hazlitt will argue that the 
arts are not progressive, that the diffusion of culture should never be mistaken for its 
improvement. 
 
*  *  * 
 
  When Alexander Gerard lectures to the Aberdeen Philosophical Society from 
1758-69 on the nature of genius, he adds to a prestigious body of work on the nature of 
achievement and the discovery of knowledge.  M.H. Abrams remarks that Gerard's Essay 
on Genius (1774) "remained for a century the most comprehensive and detailed study 
devoted . . . to the psychology of the inventive process."  In the last part, Gerard 
considers the nature of imagination "in the two kinds of genius."  He employs a broad 
rubric found in Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, a pairing reincarnated by C.P. Snow as the 
"two cultures."  But Gerard's division is somewhat different.  His two kinds of genius are, 
first, scientific and philosophic--tellingly, he groups philosophy with science--and, 
second, artistic.   All Europe read Gerard's Essay on Genius with enthusiasm.  One reader 
comments on the 1776 German translation:  "Gerard, an Englishman, has written about 
genius, and the treatment he puts forward is the best, although the matter has been 
discussed by a number of other writers."  Kant voices this superlative praise, and will 
soon echo Gerard's views. 
  Much could be said about Gerard's work, though little has been.  Here we focus 
on the new distinction he makes between imaginative genius in the arts contrasted to that 
in the sciences and philosophy.  He does not deny that one person may excel in both, but 
thinks such "flexible" genius highly uncommon.  Because genius in science requires 
increasing specialization and advancement, Gerard implies such flexibility will grow 
more rare as science amasses knowledge geometrically.  His example of James Beattie as 
uniting art and science--Beattie writes a religio-philosophical Essay on Truth and a poem, 
The Minstrel, itself exploring genius in art and science--is unconvincing, despite the fact 
that both works were hugely popular.  Also unconvincing is Gerard's example of 
Hogarth, who treats aesthetics, but not natural, moral, or analytical philosophy, or 
science. 
  Gerard is clear about what divides genius in science and philosophy from genius 
in art.  Both employ invention, but genius in science and philosophy evinces 
"penetration," while in art it exercises "brightness."  Science addresses the 
"understanding," art the external "senses" and "taste."  Science and philosophy seek out 
relation, cause and effect; its genius examines the minute and exact; it desires 
comprehension and explication; it traces "closely" the nature of things and tries to "fix" 
their relations.  It projects "gravity," "sedateness," and "austerity." 
  Genius in art adumbrates a final work and will "modify" its constituent parts 
"intuitively" to shape that whole.  Gerard gives the germ for the theory of the work of art 
as an organic totality.  (He also vindicates Coleridge's claim that "intuition" was used earlier in English; Reynolds uses it, too, in his Discourses, as does Dryden in Heroique 
Stanzas.)  Genius in art will "hurry" through a "multitude" of images using powers of 
"suggestion."  Fascinated with "resemblance," it displays "sprightliness," "gaiety," 
"vivacity," and "impetuosity."  In art the passions must be aroused; in science they only 
prejudice "truth."  Gerard's division uses the laws of the association of ideas:  science and 
philosophy follow the laws of cause and effect and contiguity; the arts rely more on the 
law of resemblance.  The inference may not be fair, but Gerard makes it. 
  This may seem trite, but there are deeper consequences.  Gerard identifies genius 
in science and philosophy with "truth and knowledge."  He calls this work "important."  
Art, instead, gives "pleasure" through "beauty," a quality he does not define well.  Trying 
to be even-handed, Gerard undercuts his balance by attributing to genius in art a 
preoccupation with "adorning" and "ornament," with what he calls, amazingly, the 
"trivial."  Gerard has removed a basis in ideas from the arts; he has weakened their 
relation to philosophy and, even while praising artistic imagination as subsuming the 
power of judgment, he aligns it, too, with the older idea of fancy as operating chiefly by 
visual resemblance. 
  We can frame this another way.  Genius in science and philosophy is important; it 
has epistemological value; it creates knowledge; it uses concepts and establishes truths; it 
is solid and penetrating; it progresses and it lasts.  Imagination in art can claim not one of 
these attributes.  Its genius produces pleasure through designs and images, ornamenting 
what is known, appealing to taste through resemblance, through the trivial, and through 
parts with no real connection outside the inner aesthetic logic of the work of art.  Art 
involves a pleasing cheat, a deception, something escapist as much as recreative.  Science 
and philosophy, on the other hand, own "truth" and "knowledge." 
  Gerard articulates a crisis of knowledge facing poetry, and also clearly implies 
that poetry cannot be philosophic.  His analysis and others' like his later harden into Benthamite utilitarianism, and are reflected by De Quincey's categories of the Literature 
of Knowledge versus the Literature of Power.  But the lines are clearly drawn when 
Blake is a child.  This challenge--a tectonic shift unbalancing the arts and sciences and 
their human origins, hence a fundamental shift in the content and significance of culture--
is answered by a new set of ideas about knowledge, the natural world, and human nature, 
and that answer is romantic poetry.  That poetry is nothing less than a newly posited 
relation of the arts and sciences, a new culture, a word Wordsworth first uses in its 
modern sense in the 1805 Prelude. 
  In Kant's Third Critique, we are struck by how little credit he gives art and poetry 
in knowing anything, in securing or creating any knowledge.  While his critique of 
aesthetic judgment carries more ethical valence than usually credited, it is vacant of 
epistemological claims; taste and beauty have only an analogous function to real concepts 
found in science, morality, philosophy, and reason.  Attacks on poetry had assaulted its 
putative misrepresentation or immorality (e.g., Plato, Gosson), but this, more insidious, is 
no direct attack; it is a wolf in sheep's clothing.  Its praise threatens to make poetry 
irrelevant in whole realms of value and endeavor.  The palace of art becomes love in a 
hut.  The arts exercise passion and pleasure but know nothing; they operate by beauty not 
truth.  Philosophy and science penetrate and reveal; art pleases, period. 
  No longer, then, any larger unity, the arts and sciences are split, and this threatens 
to split what is considered culture--and to alienate human nature from it.  Every 
significant romantic poet realizes this challenge, and that realization is largely what 
separates the work of those poets to whom two centuries of readers constantly return 
from the work of those eventually less read and less canonized.  The response to this 
challenge brings, at its highest attainments, either joy or irony.  Each response belongs to 
what Keats calls the "authenticity of imagination." 
 *  *  * 
 
  What we've been discussing is the theme of Keats's great and greatly 
misunderstood symbolic allegory Lamia.  It is a tale "Hard for the non-elect to 
understand."  Keats puts the vision not in the analytical prose of Gerard but in a 
vocabulary astonishingly identical.  The philosopher and scientist Apollonius possesses a 
serious, grave air.  Seeking causes and effects, representing "consequitive reasoning"--
which in his famous letter Keats says must hold true as much as does that negative 
capability necessary for great achievement--the "perceant" eye of Apollonius pierces 
Lamia and paralyzes her.  Lycius, in thrall to her illusions, resemblances, and passions, 
can only gasp for breath when they are revealed as a serpent's cheat.  Lamia vanishes; 
Lycius dies.  The depth of Keats's mind committed to articulating ideas, his honesty as a 
thinker, and his verbal craft as a poet, together weave a text where he uses sensuous gift 
of phrase to describe Lamia, yet soon reflects, "There was an awful rainbow once in 
heaven: / We know her woof, her texture; she is given / In the dull catalogue of common 
things," the same example Gerard and others use to cite Newton's genius.  Lamia's 
"sciential brain" is used solely "To unperplex bliss from its neighbour pain"; her only 
awareness is pleasure or passion, what Gerard avowed.  Sensuous and sensual, Lamia-
like figures soon haunt 19th-c art.  If Lamia is "knowing," it is in "knowing well / That 
but a moment's thought is passion's passing bell."  Cold science and "Philosophy will clip 
an angel's wings, / Conquer all mysteries by rule and line, / Empty the haunted air and 
gnomed mine."  Apollonius's eyes are "Keen, cruel, perceant, stinging," and the only 
thing we have to question their deadly accuracy is Lycius's indictment of them as 
"juggling," recalling the Latin for "juggler's tricks":  "prestidigitation."  Lamia calls on 
the gods to pierce his eyes to blindness with a thorn, but Apollonius survives, his vision unimpaired.  In different genres, but no less animated by ideas, Margaret Fuller, George 
Eliot, and Mary Shelley brood on the great debate Keats allegorizes. 
  Wordsworth in his Preface, in a passage echoed by Coleridge in chapter 14 of the 
Biographia distinguishes the man of science from the poet.  Wordsworth's train of 
argument is a studied answer to Gerard:  "The poet writes under one restriction only, 
namely, the necessity of giving immediate pleasure . . . Nor let this necessity of 
producing immediate pleasure be considered as a degradation.  We have no knowledge, 
that is, no general principles drawn from the contemplation of particular facts, but what 
has been built up by pleasure.  The Man of science feels that his knowledge is pleasure; 
and where he has no pleasure he has no knowledge. . . .  The knowledge both of the Poet 
and the Man of science is pleasure."  The knowledge of the poet "cleaves to us as a 
necessary part of our existence, our natural and unalienable inheritance" involved with 
"habitual and direct sympathy connecting us with our fellow-beings."  Wordsworth may 
be taking a cue from Joanna Baillie's "Introductory Discourse to Plays on the Passions," 
where she dismisses much literature as escapist, fantastic, or merely sentimental, calling 
all that "nonsense," but she avows that "the highest pleasures we receive from poetry, as 
well as from the real objects which surround us in the world, are derived from the 
sympathetick interest we take in beings like ourselves."  Without this, she says, in a 
revealing image that ends her "Discourse," "our remembrance" of all the verbal glories 
and inventiveness of poetry "would rest upon our minds like the measurement and 
distances of the planets." 
  To close his enthymemes on poetry and science, Wordsworth concludes, the poet 
is the "rock of defence for human nature."  Similarly, for Keats, the poet might escape to 
verbal felicity only, a mere fever of itself; or, like the "human friend philosopher," the 
poet might instead "lift the thoughts and soothe the cares of humankind."  In Germany, it 
was said that Schelling had again made the world a place for religion, love, and poetry.  Shelley reasserts the claims of sympathy, love, and knowledge bound together.  Poetry 
"is at once the centre and circumference of knowledge . . . comprehends all science."  
Poetry creates civil society, culture.  Shelley is not answering Gerard, but Peacock, 
whose attack in The Four Ages of Poetry bears repeating:  "Poetry cannot travel out of 
the regions of . . . the uncultivated lands of semi-civilized men. . . .  While the historian 
and philosopher are advancing in, and accelerating, the progress of knowledge, the poet is 
wallowing in the rubbish of departed ignorance. . . ."  If a poet "can impose" on any 
"common readers," it is only because "a man who knows something, however little, 
always possesses [a "commanding advantage"] over one who knows nothing. . . .  A 
poet's ideas, thoughts, feelings, associations, are all with barbarous manners. . . .  The 
march of his intellect is like that of a crab, backward."  Peacock's Four Ages may be half 
tongue-in-cheek, calculated to provoke, and he is not above stealing an image from 
Hamlet.  But he voices a dominant view when he contrasts all that poetry does to "the 
thinking and studious, and scientific and philosophical part of the community." 
 
*  *  * 
 
  The deep shift in the nature of culture and knowledge, the crisis of poetry, is a 
matter of utmost concern to those poets we continue to value.  We renew our interest in 
the poetry of sentiment, in part because we realize, with Hume, that sentiment 
accompanies every idea.  But sentiment alone is not an idea, and so the more any poetry 
is identified as sentiment exclusively, however great its verbal gifts, the more it will fail 
to address the constant, self-conscious redefinition of human nature in relation to the 
knowledge it acquires and the new culture it continually creates. 
  Helen Vendler, in her study of Seamus Heaney, says that the success of lyric has 
nothing to do with "themes" but everything to do with accuracy of language related to the emotions of the speaker.  I agree with her about many things but not this.  It is a partial 
truth.  Even in lyric, let alone the greater lyric, odes, narrative, and long poems, the verbal 
gift of phrase--what Arnold calls poetry "as poetry," the success at new combinations of 
words--cannot be sustained without profound qualities of mind, which in poetry are 
expressed through images and symbols that convey not emotions only but emotions 
interfused with ideas.  What James Merrill calls "hole-in-one at word golf" is a means but 
not the complete end of such poetry.  Something more is needed to bring "the whole soul 
of man into activity," to compose, as Coleridge says Wordsworth is capable of 
composing, "the first genuine philosophic poem."  If poetry were simply accuracy of 
language keyed to emotional states, or to the state of any being or object, "if" this goal, 
however "fine" and aesthetic it may be, "is the very thing in which consists poetry," 
muses Keats on this very point, then "it is not so fine a thing as philosophy--For the same 
reason that an eagle is not so fine a thing as a truth."  In a more positive formulation, as 
Coleridge puts it in a letter, "A great Poet must be, implicitè if not explicitè, a profound 
Metaphysician."  The new ideas expressed by romantic poetry--ideas about language, the 
soul, history, art, sympathy and the passions, about love, spirituality and the transcendent, 
about what constitutes culture, the very relation of the arts and the sciences as they 
inform our inner lives--amount, perhaps, not to the creation of a new human nature, but at 
the very least to a new articulation of human nature.  To use Emerson's pronouncement, 
"the mind became aware of itself"; and with this freshening self-consciousness, "the best 
part of human language," Coleridge would contend, "is formed by a voluntary 
appropriation of fixed symbols to internal acts, to processes and results of imagination."  
The rules of criticism become the workings of the imagination.  The ideas and emotions 
of significant poetry drawn from this or from any time will always be as vital for the 
attainment of our wider knowledge--which includes self-knowledge--as is the most 
technically advanced grasp of reality in the present.  So, when we trace the flowing river, the history of our humanity, and come to our own personal River Duddon, "We feel that 
we are greater than we know." 
  This is no call for poetry as a gussied up paraphrase of pre-cast philosophy, what 
Randall Jarrell criticizes, rightly or wrongly, in Wallace Stevens, himself so deeply 
influenced by romantic thought, especially Coleridge's; rather, it recognizes that the 
language of poetry is inextricably bound up with images, and images with ideas.  If we 
trace the origins of these elusive terms we will find it so.  And the ability to create new 
images and ideas is what makes the best exercise of poetry superior to, not dependent 
upon, ideology.  For ideologies are often nothing more than the hardened cinders left by 
an extinguished fire of ideas. 
  At least two related matters present themselves.  First, genre:  one summit of 
poetic achievement had been the epic.  To compose one, it had been thought since the 
early Renaissance essential to be learned, to have studied, as Milton did, and as Dryden 
planned but never did--ten years or more.  Romantic poetry rejects such learning in favor 
of ideas.  T.S. Eliot continues to reject such learning for modernist poetry in "Tradition 
and the Individual Talent":  "It will even be affirmed that much learning deadens or 
perverts poetic sensibility."  What is important is not massed knowledge but 
"consciousness of the past."  The epics of Wordsworth and of Byron do not presuppose or 
evince wide learning but are exquisite in their consciousness of the past.  Theirs are 
poems of personal temperament facing a world where applied knowledge is, more often 
than not, inhumane.  Byron uses it as a foil.  "The patent age of new invention," the age 
of Humphrey Davy's coal lamps and the like, "serve mankind "as true / Perhaps, as 
shooting them at Waterloo."  Poetry that directly expresses the results of science as 
objective knowledge flares then dies out; the last science to enjoy widespread poetic 
treatment is geology because it is the least experimental, the most historical, and the most 
directly connected with landscape.   Second, the canon:  the romantic poets we return to with greatest frequency are 
those who recognize the signal challenges that new knowledge and new technologies 
present to us and thus to poetry, and whose work contains, in ideas as well as in language 
and feeling, a convincing or meaningful response to those challenges, a response that 
defends the human.  These ideas are not happy pieties; some are tied in the hard knot of 
skepticism, some in the Gordian Knot of irony.  Many come in debates, many are 
doubted.  The speed and order of the canonization of these poets is directly correlated to 
the transparency with which they express their ideas, with Byron and Wordsworth 
coming first (being so transparent, Byron lost ground during modernism and the New 
Criticism), followed by Coleridge and Keats, and, if strong critical notice and 
sympathetic understanding are a measure, with Shelley and Blake last. 
  We live with constant realignments of the arts and sciences; any culture 
encompassing them must be in flux.  To read Francis Bacon, to chart his intense 
ambivalence, his admiration yet distrust of figurative language, is to see in embryo this 
characteristic of modernity.  Now we are on the verge of altering our own natures 
genetically.  If we do it well, it will be worthwhile, but the flow of knowledge and its 
implications for what we mean by human nature continue to accelerate.  Romantic poets 
answer the challenge of humanizing the knowledge we gain, of remaining human in the 
face of the new powers and new sorrows such knowledge brings.  Their obstinate 
questionings, their poems, are therefore friends to us, but the challenge persists.  We hope 
for great spirits now on earth.  Los admonishes us.  We stand, like Keats's dreamer--or 
poet-- in The Fall of Hyperion, at the bottom of the steps, and we are admonished. 